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NOTES
OIo's HOMEOWNER DISCLOSURE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ohio legislature recently enacted a homeowner disclosure
law to require disclosures by sellers of residential property.' Prior
to this enactment, residential disclosures were governed by Ohio
common law. By adopting statutory disclosure requirements, Ohio
joined a number of jurisdictions which have residential disclosure
requirements defined by statute or regulation. This Note examines
Ohio's statute, compares it to Ohio's prior common law, evaluates
the statute against those of other jurisdictions, suggests effective
interpretations of its provisions, and forecasts areas of continuing
or new litigation.
The background section of this Note first reviews the common
law in Ohio regarding seller disclosure on transfers of residential
property. A brief discussion of the national push toward statutory
disclosure requirements follows, which then leads to the introduc-
tion of Ohio's statute. The analysis section first examines the Ohio
statute's provisions and notes similar provisions in other states. The
analysis then takes three different perspectives on the Ohio statute
to determine: (1) whether the statute advances the rationales behind
Ohio's common law and satisfies the policy objectives underlying
the statutory enactment; (2) whether the statute compares favorably
with similar statutes developed in other jurisdictions; and (3) what
type of difficulties may arise in implementation of the statute.
Finally, the conclusion section highlights the advantages of the
Ohio statute and summarizes its contentious implications.
1. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (Baldwin 1992).
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II. BACKGROUND
Historically, the doctrine of caveat emptor2 reigned over the
transfer of property? Based on the assumption of equal bargaining
power between parties in an arms-length transaction,4 the courts re-
fused to introduce a moral element requiring sellers to disclose
hidden defects or problems that provided them with a bargaining
advantage. However, cracks in the shield of caveat emptor devel-
oped as courts slowly recognized that sellers of residential proper-
ties held the substantial bargaining edge of familiarity with the
property. In other words, sellers possessed 'superior knowledge.' 6
Consequently, courts developed numerous exceptions to the doc-
trine of caveat emptor, primarily where the seller knew of a defect
in the property, the nature of which the buyer would not be able
to discover or which presented a dangerous condition As a result
of these exceptions to caveat emptor, controversies swirled for
decades regarding what constitutes a defect, how diligent a buyer
2. "[L]et the buyer beware. Expresses the rule of law that the purchaser buys at his
own risk." BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 65 (3d ed. 1991). For a discussion of the devel-
opment of the doctrine of caveat emptor in judicial decisions, see Walton H. Hamilton,
The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1135 (1931).
3. See Richard M. Jones, Comment, Risk Allocation and the Sale of Defective Used
Housing in Ohio: Should Silence be Golden?, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 215, 216 (1991)
(discussing the development of caveat emptor and the exceptions to the doctrine); Serena
Kafker, Sell and Tell: The Fall and Revival of the Rule on Nondisclosure in Sale of
Used Real Property, 12 U. DAYTON L. REv. 57, 57-58 (1986) (noting the use of caveat
emptor in property law and the development of exceptions to the doctrine).
4. See Jones, supra note 3, at 216; William L. Niro, Let the Seller Beware! Illinois
Adopts the Implied Warranty of Fitness in the Sale of a New Home, 68 ILL. BJ. 770,
771 (1980) ("[B]uyers of realty are presumed to be knowledgeable in house construction
and in equal bargaining position with the vendor of the property.").
5. Hendrick v. Lynn, 144 A.2d 147, 149 (Del. Ch. 1958) (declining to find a cause
of action for nondisclosure, the court refused to "adopt a moral code for vendor and pur-
chaser which to date has no substantial legal sanction"); Swinton v. Whitinsville Say.
Bank, 42 N.E.2d 808, 808-09 (Mass. 1942) (holding that seller of a termite-infested house
had no duty to disclose the infestation to the buyer. "The law has not yet, we believe,
reached the point of imposing upon the frailties of human nature a standard so idealistic
as this.").
6. See, e.g., Wilhite v. Mays, 232 S.E.2d 141, 143 (Ga. CL App. 1976) (finding an
exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor which "places upon the seller a duty to dis-
close in situations where he or she has special knowledge not apparent to the buyer");
Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 512 (N.D. 1985) ("While the relationship between
seller and buyer may not be a fiduciary or confidential one, it is marked by the clearly
superior position of the seller vis-a-vis knowledge of the condition of the property being
sold.").
7. Jones, supra note 3, at 219; Kafker, supra note 3, at 59.
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must be to conclude that a defect was not discoverable, and what
qualifies as a dangerous condition.
A. Ohio's Common Law on Seller Disclosure
Ohio's common law on seller disclosure characterized defects
as either patent8 or latent.9 Consistent with the rule of caveat
emptor, the buyer bore the responsibility for discovering patent de-
fects. Sellers were obliged to disclose latent defects to buyers. In
some circumstances, a seller could employ a disclaimer clause in
the transfer contract to avoid disclosing latent defects to the buyer.
However, seller liability was found in situations where the seller's
representations or responses to inquiries by the buyer turned out to
be false or misleading.
1. Patent Defects under Caveat Emptor
In Ohio, the doctrine of caveat emptor and its exceptions have
remained fairly constant during the last two generations. Despite
the rather simple statement in Traverse v. Long"0 that "[t]he prin-
ciple of caveat emptor applies to sales of real estate relative to
conditions open to observation,"" the implementation of that rule
has not been so straightforward. Indeed, the court in Traverse
found that the filled-in land on which a driveway and parking area
had been constructed was "open to observation." The buyer, an
attorney, was "put on notice" of the condition (the fill) and result-
ing damages were found to result from the buyer's own lack of
diligence."
The rule from Traverse was still being used as recently as
1988, when it was specifically quoted and incorporated into Lay-
man v. Binns.3 The Layman court expounded upon the usefulness
of the doctrine of caveat emptor in reducing the volume of litiga-
8. A patent defect is "a defect that could be recognized upon reasonably careful in-
spection or through the use of ordinary diligence and care." BARRON'S LAW DIcIONARY,
supra note 2, at 345.
9. A latent defect is "a defect not discoverable even by exercise of ordinary and
reasonable care." Id. at 268.
10. 135 N.E.2d 256 (Ohio 1956).
11. Id. at 259. "Where those conditions are discoverable and the purchaser has the op-
portunity for investigation and determination without concealment or hindrance by the
vendor, the purchaser has no just cause for complaint even though there are misstatements
and misrepresentations by the vendor not so reprehensible in nature as to constitute
fraud." Id.
12. Id.
13. 519 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio 1988).
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tion"4 and maintained that "[a] seller of realty is not obligated to
reveal all that he or she knows."' 5 The defect in Layman was a
bowed foundation wall reinforced with structural steel bracing in
the basement. The buyer claimed that he "should not be held to
have knowledge of the defect simply because he saw a symptom
of it."' 6 The buyers were not awarded damages of the cost to
repair the defect, which were estimated at fifty percent of the pur-
chase price. Both the filled-in land in Traverse and the bowed
foundation in Layman were considered patent defects, discoverable
by a buyer. The buyers had "a duty to inspect and inquire about
the premises in a prudent, diligent manner" so as to ascertain all
patent defects.
17
The defense of caveat emptor can impose substantial financial
hardship on the buyer. The justification for allowing this hardship,
beyond controlling litigation, was that the buyer has an affirmative
duty to inspect the premises.' Consequently, the buyer's offer
was presumed to reflect any defect that a reasonably prudent buyer
would observe and consider in tendering an offer. 9 Because the
characterization of a defect as patent left the buyer without re-
course, buyers often argued that the defect was latent and not open
to observation, in hopes of triggering the seller's duty to disclose.
2. Latent Defects under Caveat Emptor
Where the condition is not open to observation, the latent
defect does not fall within the protection of the doctrine of caveat
emptor. ° One of the classic examples of a latent defect is termite
infestation. Some jurisdictions have found that termite infestation
14. "Mhe doctrine performs a function in the real estate marketplace. Without the
doctrine nearly every sale would invite litigation instituted by a disappointed buyer." Id. at
644.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing Traverse v. Long, 135 N.E.2d 256, 259 (Ohio 1956), and Foust v.
Valleybrook Realty, 446 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (Ohio CL App. 1981)).
18. Layman v. Binns, 519 N.E.2d 642, 644 (Ohio 1988).
19. Jones, supra note 3, at 216-17 ("Parties to an arm's length transaction are presum-
ably aware of the risks they assume and protect themselves accordingly."); Hamilton,
supra note 2, at 1186 ("[C]aveat emptor sharpened wits, taught self-reliance, made a man
- an economic man - out of the buyer, and served well its two masters, business and jus-
tice.").
20. Miles v. McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367, 1370 (Ohio 1979); see Kafker, supra note
3, at 65 (stating that the seller has a duty to disclose latent defects that could not be de-
tected with reasonable inspection).
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does not present an exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor
even where the seller was aware of substantial damage caused by
the termites.2 Ohio courts, however, have been fairly consistent in
finding that such an infestation presents either a latent defect or
dangerous condition exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor,
thus requiring the seller to disclose the condition to the buyer.'
In Miles v. McSwegin,' the seller's broker was held liable to
the buyers for representing the premises as being "a good solid
home" and thereafter having the property treated for termite infes-
tation without disclosing this treatment to the buyers.24 Although
the seller, the seller's broker, and the buyer's mortgagee all knew
about the infestation and subsequent remedial treatment, liability for
nondisclosure was found against only the broker and the mortgagee
with total damages exceeding the purchase price of the house.'
Liability for nondisclosure may be assessed against the broker, as
in Miles, or against the seller. Use of the latent defect exception to
a defense of caveat emptor imposed substantial financial liability
after the sale transaction was closed and final. The seller, of
course, typically has expended most of her financial resources on
the purchase of her next house.
The justification for the latent defect exception to the doctrine
of caveat emptor as providing a measure of protection for the
innocent buyer is well illustrated in Tucker v. Kritzer.26 The defect
at issue was in a chimney for a wood burning stove which was not
constructed according to building code requirements.' The buyer
was particularly interested in buying a home with a wood burning
stove.' The court found that she had ample opportunity to inspect
the premises and that the sellers had not engaged in fraud,29 yet
21. Hendrick v. Lynn, 144 A.2d 147, 149 (Del. Ch. 1958) (ruling that where the seller
had placed a rug over a hole in the wood floor that had been eaten away by termites,
the seller had no duty to disclose the infestation and the buyer had no cause of action
against the seller). For an overview of the conflicting seller disclosure obligations for ter-
mite infestations, see E.T. Tsai, Annotation, Duty of Vendor of Real Estate to Give Pur-
chaser Information as to Termite Infestation, 22 A.L.R.3d 972 § 3 (1968) (Supp. 1993).
22. See Miles, 388 N.E.2d at 1370 (citing sources).
23. 388 N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio 1979).
24. Id. at 1368.
25. Id.; Miles v. Perpetual Say. & Loan, 388 N.E.2d 1364, 1366 (Ohio 1979) (finding
the mortgagee liable to the buyers on an agency theory).
26. 561 N.E.2d 1033 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
27. Id. at 1034.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1035.
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the court ruled in favor of the buyer by a methodical application
of Traverse v. Long." The court restated the Traverse rule:
The doctrine of caveat emptor precludes recovery in an
action by the purchaser for a structural defect in real estate
where (1) the condition complained of is open to observa-
tion or discoverable upon reasonable inspection, (2) the
purchaser had the unimpeded opportunity to examine the
premises, and (3) there is not fraud on the part of the
vendor.3'
The court elaborated that "[a]ll three elements must concurrently
occur to make the defense available to the sellers; if [one] element
is missing, then the defense [is] unavailable."32 Despite fulfillment
of two of the conditions, the fact that the chimney defect was not
discoverable upon reasonable inspection precluded the sellers' de-
fense of caveat emptor.33 The court explained that "[r]easonable
inspection would include only eye observation in the absence of
some exterior sign of a latent defect . . . [and] reasonable inspec-
tion did not require disassembly of the chimney connection." '
Since the defective chimney construction was not observable by a
buyer conducting a reasonable inspection, the defect was character-
ized as latent. The seller therefore had a duty to disclose it.
The latent defect exception to the caveat emptor defense builds
on the superior knowledge advantage of the seller and the seller's
control over the premises. The seller is required to disgorge unique
knowledge of material defects so that they may be reflected in the
calculation of the value of the premises. Therefore, the classifica-
tion of a defect as latent provides some relief for the buyer who
discovers the condition after purchasing the premises and, corre-
spondingly, extends the seller's liability for nondisclosure beyond
the completion of the purchase transaction.
30. 135 N.E.2d 256 (Ohio 1956).
31. Tucker v. Kritzer, 561 N.E.2d 1033, 1035 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (citing Traverse v.
Long, 135 N.E.2d 256, 259 (Ohio 1956)).
32. Id.
33. The sellers themselves were held liable for damages, not the seller's broker, despite
the broker listing the house specifically as having a "'place for [a] wood-burning stove."'
Id. at 1034.
34. Id. at 1035.
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3. Latent Defects 'and Disclaimer Clauses
As the cracks in the shield of caveat emptor opened, sellers
turned to another longstanding technique to limit their liability. The
use of a disclaimer in the transfer contract represented the buyer's
agreement to take the property in its existing "as is" condition."
The court in Kaye v. Buehrle3" summarized the Ohio common law
by ruling "that when a buyer contractually agrees to accept proper-
ty 'as is', the seller is relieved of any duty to disclose. [However,]
[a]n 'as is' clause cannot be relied upon to bar a claim for fraudu-
lent misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment." 37 In Kaye, the
sellers had patched cracks in the basement caused by structural
problems eight years prior to selling the house. At the time of the
sale, the basement was still likely to "leak during a torrential
rain."'38 Finding no evidence of representations by the sellers as to
the condition of the basement on which the buyers could claim to
have relied nor any evidence indicating that the sellers had patched
the cracks in the basement with an intent to conceal the defects,
the court found that the "as is" clause written in the transfer con-
tract "clearly places the risk upon the [buyers] as to the existence
of any defects."39 The "as is" disclaimer clause in the transfer
agreement shifted the risk of latent defects from the seller's duty to
disclose to the buyer's duty to investigate and inquire.
The power of the disclaimer clause to relieve the seller of
liability for nondisclosure is significant. Its use eliminates the first
element of the Traverse test: the question of whether the defect
was open to observation.'4 The existence of a leaky basement,
when not inspected during inclement weather, is arguably a latent
defect." The 1992 case of Tipton v. Nuzum42 reaffirmed the risk-
35. For an overview of seller liability and the "as is" clause, see generally Frank J.
Wozniak, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision in Contract for Sale of Realty
by Which Purchaser Agrees to Take Property "As Is" or in its Existing Condition, 8
A.L.R.5th 312 (1992).
36. 457 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
37. Id. at 376.
38. Id. at 374.
39. Id. at 376.
40. See supra text accompanying note 31.
41. See, e.g., Long v. Brownstone Real Estate, 484 A.2d 126, 128 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984) (holding that six-inch watermark on basement walls was not such an obvious defect
as to put the buyers on notice of the potential for extensive flooding); but see Tipton v.
Nuzum, 616 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (finding ancillary conditions sufficient to
impose on the buyer an obligation to investigate further the possibility of the basement
11551995]
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shifting advantage of the "as is" clause. The court held that the
sellers "had no duty to disclose any knowledge of past water prob-
lems with the basement,"'43 thus placing the duty to investigate or
inquire about defects squarely upon the buyer.
The risk-shifting effect of the disclaimer clause is a step back-
ward in the promulgation of protection for buyers; in other words,
it is a step back toward the doctrine of caveat emptor. Some courts
have indicated that the presence of a disclaimer clause in the pur-
chase contract should put the buyer "on notice" that the premises
may have defects and that it is incumbent on the buyer to inquire
and inspect further." However, the inquisitive and questioning
buyer retains a significant degree of protection because the seller is
legally obliged to respond truthfully and completely to direct inqui-
ries in order to preclude charges of fraud.'
4. Latent Defects and the Duty to Speak
The powerful "as is" disclaimer clause could not prevent seller
liability for nondisclosure of latent defects when the seller had a
duty to disclose such defects. Such a duty to speak may arise from
a seller's professional qualifications or in response to a buyer's
specific inquiries. The court in Mancini v. Gorick" explained:
Although a claim of nondisclosure will not overcome an
'as is' clause, a claim of fraudulent concealment will. Non-
disclosure will become the equivalent of fraudulent conceal-
ment when it becomes the duty of a person to speak in
order that the party with whom he is dealing may be
placed on an equal footing with him.47
In Mancini, the duty to speak arose because the seller told the
leaking).
42. 616 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
43. Id. at 269. "We have previously held that when property is accepted in an 'as is'
condition, the seller is relieved of any duty to disclose." Id. (citing Kaye v. Buehrle, 457
N.E.2d 373, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)).
44. See id. at 268 ("Under certain circumstances, a reasonably prudent person should
be put on notice of a possible defect which necessitates either further inquiry of the own-
er or inspection by someone with more expertise."); Kafker, supra note 3, at 68 ("'The
'as is' clause in the contract itself implies that the property was in some way defec-
tive."') (quoting Universal Inv. Co. v. Sahara Motor Inn, 619 P.2d 485, 487 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1980)).
45. See discussion infra part II.A.4.
46. 536 N.E.2d 8 (Ohio CL App. 1987).
47. Id. at 9, 10 (citation omitted).
1156 [Vol. 45:1149
OHIO'S HOMEOWNER DISCLOSURE LAW
buyer that the seller himself, an architectural engineer, had de-
signed and built the house. Therefore, the buyer had justifiably
relied on the seller's professional expertise to construct the house
without residual latent defects." Builder-vendors, because of their
professional expertise and their ability to prevent latent defects,
generally do not have access to either the doctrine of caveat emp-
tor or "as is" disclaimer clauses as defenses.49 As discussed later,
they are also excluded from the disclosure requirements of Ohio's
seller disclosure law.5"
The duty to speak truthfully and completely was not limited to
professional builders and developers. In Brewer v. Brothers,"1 the
seller responded "'[y]ou have nothing to worry about"' to inquiries
from the buyer about the condition of the electrical system. The
seller was held liable for damages despite an 'as is' clause in the
transfer contract because the electrical system was defective.52 The
Brewer court asserted "that the buyer's duty to inspect the premises
to discover defects terminates when representations are made with
respect to a material fact in response to a buyer's direct inqui-
$9.' 5 3
ry."5
The theory that the buyer's duty to inspect can terminate on
direct inquiry was stated by an earlier Ohio court in Foust v.
Valleybrook Realty. 4 The buyers in Foust had specifically in-
quired about the sanitary sewer system. The seller's broker dis-
cussed an option to tie into a new municipal system and estimated
the costs to do so. After the buyers completed the purchase, they
discovered that the sewer tie-in was mandatory and the costs to-
taled over eight hundred percent of the broker's estimate.55 The
seller and the broker proffered the defense of caveat emptor, but
the court was not persuaded. The court stated that "although the
purchasers had a duty to inquire and to inspect the premises in a
prudent manner ... they had a right to rely upon the representa-
48. Id. at 10.
49. For a discussion of builder-vendor liability to both initial and subsequent purchas-
ers, see David J. Strasser, Extension of Implied Warranties to Subsequent Purchasers of
Real Property: Insurance Company of North America v. Bonnie Built Homes, 43 Omo
ST. LU. 951 (1982).
50. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(B)(2)(1) (Baldwin 1992); see infra text accompa-
nying note 80.
51. 611 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
52. Id. at 493.
53. ld at 495.
54. 446 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
55. Id. at 1122.
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tions of [the broker] and were not under a duty to inquire of oth-
ers after receiving answers to their questions."'56 Sellers must re-
spond to direct inquiries from buyers in such a way as to be nei-
ther misleading nor incomplete in order to avoid liability for non-
disclosure or fraud.
The affirmative duty of sellers to speak truthfully and com-
pletely can provide substantial protection for the buyer who knows
to ask questions and knows the right questions to ask. Justified
reliance on the seller's representations can surmount defenses of
caveat emptor and disclaimer clauses. Upon questioning, the burden
shifts to the seller to speak carefully and represent honestly the
condition of the premises, for even an honest mistake on the part
of the seller may allow the buyer to rescind the purchase agree-
ment. 7
In summary, Ohio's common law on seller disclosure required:
(1) the buyer to inspect the premises in a reasonably prudent man-
ner such that patent defects became the buyer's responsibility to
discover; (2) the seller to disclose latent defects, unless the buyer
agreed to take the property "as is" in the transfer contract; and (3)
the seller to disclose defects, notwithstanding an "as is" clause in
the contract, when the seller had a duty to speak, as where the
buyer had justifiably relied upon the seller's qualifications and/or
representations.
B. Development of a Legislative Solution to Seller Disclosure
Questions of whether a condition was open to observation or
what a seller actually said will no longer be the inquiry as a result
of the Ohio legislature's enactment of a statutory disclosure provi-
sion. Ohio's enactment comports with the national trend of defining
residential disclosure requirements by statute or regulation. Ohio's
seller disclosure law, section 5302.30 of the Ohio Revised Code
provides a baseline for disclosures required in the course of trans-
fers of residential real property, effective July 1, 1993.8 For bet-
ter or worse, Ohio sellers now have a procedure to guide them and
Ohio buyers now have a procedure on which they can rely.
56. Id. at 1125.
57. Di Pippo v. Meyer, 263 N.E.2d 907 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) (finding that despite the
sellers not knowing of the defects, their representations amounted to constructive fraud
and allowed the buyers to rescind the purchase and collect damages). "Constructive fraud,
sometimes called legal fraud . . . generally involves a mere mistake of fact." Id. at 909.
58. Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5302.30(B)(1), (C) (Baldwin 1992).
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The apparent impetus behind the enactment was strong lobby-
ing by the Ohio Board of Realtors acting in nationwide concert
with the National Association of Realtors. 9 The National Associa-
tion of Realtors may have been reacting to a series of court deci-
sions across the country which awarded damages and rescission of
purchase agreements for nondisclosure of conditions never before
considered subject to disclosure. These decisions also imposed
affirmative duties of investigation and disclosure on brokers them-
selves." A 1984 California decision held that a broker must "con-
duct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the residen-
tial property listed for sale and ... [must] disclose to prospective
purchasers all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of
the property that such an investigation would reveal."'" This deci-
sion came on the heels of the bizarre Reed v. King62 case. In
Reed, the seller failed to mention to the buyer that the house being
sold had been the site of a multiple murder ten years earlier. The
court found this to be a material fact not accessible to the buyer
which the seller had a duty to disclose 3 Both damages and re-
scission were available to the buyer upon a showing that the histo-
59. See, e.g., Sherry Harowitz & John Parmelee, Defect Disclosure; A Mixed Blessing
for Home Sellers, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., Nov. 1991, at 90, 91 ("Home sellers in
most states are required by law to disclose significant known defects, but so far only
California and Maine require broad-ranging written disclosures. The National Association
of Realtors would like to see such documents in all states."); James D. Lawlor, Mandato-
ry Seller Disclosure Laws, PROB. & PROP., July-Aug. 1992, at 34 ("Currently, only two
states require disclosure of property defects by a seller ... However, the topic has en-
gendered much interest and debate across the country, due in large part to the interest the
National Association of Realtors (NAR).has taken in encouraging such rules."); Amy
Saltzman, Home-Selling Headaches, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 16, 1991, at 62
("The [National Association of Realtors] recently kicked off a nationwide campaign in the
state legislatures to require sellers to reveal defects in writing."); David S. Sidor, Ohio's
New Seller Disclosure Law, OH!O LAW., May-June 1993, at 8 ("During 1992, the Ohio
Board of Realtors lobbied strongly for legislation which would make ... disclosure forms
or checklists mandatory in the sale of residential property.").
60. See Jones, supra note 3, at 228-30. For a discussion of broker liability for non-
disclosure of defects, see generally Diane M. Allen, Annotation, Real-Estate Broker's
Liability to Purchaser for Misrepresentation or Nondisclosure of Physical Defects in
Property Sold, 46 A.L.R.4th 546 (1992).
61. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (Ct. App. 1984). See also James
D. Lawlor, Seller Beware: Burden of Disclosing Defects Shifting to Sellers, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1992, at 90 ("The movement to achieve a legislative solution to the disclosure prob-
lem gathered steam following the California Court of Appeal's decision in Easton v.
Strassburger.").
62. 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1983).
63. Id. at 133; see also Eugene J. Morris & Kenneth M. Block, The Buyer's Right to
Rescission, Damages, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 12, 1984, at 20 (discussing the Reed decision).
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ry of the house had a significant effect on its market value.' The
imposition of a disclosure obligation on the seller's broker to the
buyer and the elusive nature of "materiality" caused concern for
buyers, sellers, and sellers' brokers, especially with regard to the
finality of the transactions.'
Unusual findings of "materiality" were not limited to the pro-
gressive West Coast, as illustrated by the equally bizarre 1991 New
York case of Stambovsky v. Ackley.' The buyer, "to his horror,
discovered that the house he had recently contracted to purchase
was widely reputed to be possessed by poltergeists."'67 He immedi-
ately sought rescission of the contract. Despite the validity of the
doctrine of caveat emptor in New York common law and an "as
is" disclaimer clause in the purchase agreement, the court distin-
guished the issue at law, which would have provided no remedy,
and determined the matter as an issue in equity, which permitted
rescission.68 Despite the amusing prose of the court's decision, it
left both sellers' and brokers' heads spinning with questions about
the type of defect that must be disclosed to avoid liability for
nondisclosure.69 The result of this confusion has been nationwide
pressure on state legislatures to adopt statutory disclosure re-
quirements describing what must be disclosed and developing mea-
sures to limit liability for nondisclosure.
The California legislature was the first to try to dispel the con-
fusion with the enactment of legislative measures in 1987 which
provided written disclosure requirements."0 Following California's
lead, eighteen states, including Ohio, have enacted comprehensive
64. Reed, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
65. See Aurora Mackey, Home Moaners, CAL. LAW., Dec. 1992, at 20, 23 ("'I don't
think the average seller knows what he has to disclose anymore. It's confusing for every-
one."' (quoting the chairwoman of the Los Angeles Bar Association's real property divi-
sion)).
66. 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1991).
67. Id. at 674.
68. Id. at 675, 676. "While . . . in his pursuit of a legal remedy for fraudulent mis-
representation against the seller, plaintiff hasn't a ghost of a chance, [this court is] never-
theless moved by the spirit of equity to allow the buyer to seek rescission of the contract
of sale and recovery of his downpayment." Id. at 674, 675.
69. See Paula C. Murray, AIDS, Ghosts, Murder: Must Real Estate Brokers and Sellers
Disclose?, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 689, 700-01 (1992) ("Mhe Reed and Stambovsky
decisions . . . will put sellers and brokers in an increasingly unenviable position. Infor-
mation that has no logical bearing on the home's physical structure and does not
physically jeopardize its future residents may in some instances constitute material infor-
mation which must be disclosed to potential buyers.").
70. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102 (West 1993).
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mandatory disclosure programs.7! ' An additional nine states have
enacted limited disclosure statutes or have disclosure programs
pending in their legislatures.' Of the other twenty-three jurisdic-
tions, eleven have enacted legislation eliminating certain conditions
from mandatory disclosure.73
Ohio's legislative response sought to address not only the
brokers' agenda in terms of defining mandatory disclosure items
and limiting liability but also the litigious areas of Ohio's common
law: (1) the patent-latent defect distinction and resulting distribution
of liability for defects; (2) the disclaimer clause's risk-shifting
effect leaving the unsuspecting buyer unprotected; and (3) the
question of whether and when a seller has a duty to speak. The
Ohio statute supplants the prior common law on disclosure of
71. ALASKA STAT. § 34.70 (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2570-2578 (1994);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 508D (1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 55-2501 to 55-2518 (1994); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 765, 1 77/1 to 77/99 (1994); IOWA CODE §§ 558A.1-558A.8 (1993); MD.
CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702 (1993); MIcH. COMP. LAWS §§ 565.951-565.966
(1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2,120 (1994); OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (Baldwin
1992); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 105.465-105.490 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-20.8-1 to 5-
20.8-10 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-4-37 to 43-4-44 (1993); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 66-5-201 to 66-5-210 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-517 to 55-525 (Michie
Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 64.06.005-64.06.900 (1993); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 709
(West 1992). Maine has a disclosure program for broker-facilitated transactions by admin-
istrative regulation. See Harowitz & Parmelee, supra note 59, at 56; Lawlor, supra note
59, at 34.
72. Kentucky has a disclosure statute that applies only for broker-facilitated transac-
tions. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.360 (Baldwin 1993). Montana has a limited disclosure
statute that requires the seller to "provide a written notice to the buyer in a buy-sell
agreement or at the time of the sale to the buyer that the dwelling is equipped or is not
equipped with smoke detectors or other fire detection devices." MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-
20-113(2) (1992). New Hampshire has a limited disclosure statute that requires notification
to buyers of the potential presence of radon gas and lead paint, and disclosure of infor-
mation regarding the water supply and sewage disposal systems. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 477:4-a, c (1993).
For disclosure statutes pending in Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylva-
nia, Texas, and West Virginia, see Conn. H.B. 5722, 1995 Reg. Sess.; N.Y.A.B. 1415,
218th General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1995); N.C.H.B. 281, 1995 Reg. Sess.; Pa. H.B. 3150,
178th General Assembly, 1993-94 Reg. Sess.; Tex. H.B. 471, 74th Reg. Sess. (1995); W.
Va. H.B. 2422, 1995 Reg. Sess.
73. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-35-5-101 (1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1936(f) (1993);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.25 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-16 (1991); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37:1468 (West 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.600 (Vernon 1992); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 40.565 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-13-2 (Michie 1992); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 59, § 858-513 (West 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-270 (Law. Co-op. 1992);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-37 (1992). See also discussion infra part III.B.2.b.
The following states do not appear to have any disclosure legislation: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.
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defects in the majority of residential transfers,74 and requires the
seller to complete a property disclosure form which must be
delivered to the buyer.' The timetable for receipt of the property
disclosure form defines the buyer's ability to rescind a purchase
offer,76 and compliance with the statute limits the seller's liability
for nondisclosure while also increasing the seller's ability to rely
on the certainty of the transfer contract. 77
III. ANALYSIS
An analysis of Ohio's seller disclosure statute first requires
focusing on the statutory provisions themselves and how they inter-
relate. As each provision is discussed, its similarity or divergence
from corresponding provisions in other jurisdictions is noted. The
analysis then discusses the statute as a whole from three different
perspectives: first, comparing it to Ohio's prior common law on
disclosure; second, discussing additional issues addressed by other
jurisdictions; and third, forecasting ramifications of the new statute.
A. Ohio's Statute on Seller Disclosure: The Provisions
The statutory provisions of Ohio's new seller disclosure law
specify which transactions are not governed by the new law, delin-
eate procedural requirements for compliance with the new law,
provide the extent of seller liability, and limit buyers' remedies.
1. Transfers Affected
The Ohio statute applies to all residential real property transfers
except those which are specifically listed as exempt.78 Most of the
exceptions deal with involuntary transfers resulting from foreclo-
sure, default, or death, and voluntary transfers between co-owners
and family members.79 The most notable exemptions are those for
transfers of new construction to initial buyers, 0 transfers to buyers
who themselves have been living in the residence at least one
year," and transfers from sellers who have not been living in the
74. See discussion infra part IH.A.1.
75. See discussion infra part ILI.A.2.
76. See discussion infra part IIl.A.4.
77. See discussion infra part fIH.A.3.
78. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(B) (Baldwin 1992).
79. Id. § 5302.30(B).
80. Id. § 5302.30(B)(2)().
81. Id. § 5302.30(B)(2)(m).
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residence during the preceding year. 2 The justification for the ex-
emption given to new home transfers is based on the higher level
of care owed by builder-vendors to initial buyers. Specifically,
builder-vendors are obliged to construct the home in a workmanlike
manner.
83
Where the buyer has been living in the house prior to the sale
or where the seller has not, the transfer is exempt from the disclo-
sure requirements. No longer does the seller have the advantage
over the buyer of familiarity with the property, which was a prima-
ry justification for requiring seller disclosure of latent defects under
the common law. 4 Although the scope of transfers covered by
Ohio's statute is similar to the scope of transfers covered by the
disclosure statutes of other states,85 the three types of transfers
discussed above which are exempt in Ohio are not all exempt in
other states. For example, these three types are not explicitly ex-
empted in California. 6 In addition, Wisconsin only shares the ex-
emption for "property that has not been inhabited,"" and Virginia
only shares the exemption for "[t]ransfers involving the first sale of
a dwelling."88 Only Ohio's statute implements the logic of ex-
empting those who do not have the 'superior knowledge' advantage
from the disclosure requirements.
2. Statutory Procedures
The Ohio statute requires sellers to complete a Property Disclo-
sure Form, 9 "in good faith,"9' making approximations where "an
item of information is unknown,"' and to deliver the form "to
82. Id. § 5302.30(B)(2)(n). Non-occupying sellers are exempted only when they re-
ceived the property by inheritance or devise. Id.
83. See Strasser, supra note 49, at 951, 954.
84. See supra text following note 34.
85. The Oregon statute is different from all the other statutes considered here in that
disclosure is not mandatory. In a residential real estate transaction, the seller must either
make a property disclosure statement or make a written disclaimer "that the seller makes
no representations or warranties as to the condition of the real property or any improve-
ment thereon and that the buyer will be purchasing the property 'as is,' that is, with all
defects, if any." OR. REV. STAT. § 105.465(2) (1993). The Tennessee statute allows the
buyer to waive the disclosure requirements. TOM. CODE ANN. § 66-5-202(2) (1994).
86. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.1.
87. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 709.01.
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-518A9.
89. OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(C).
90. Id. § 5302.30(E)(1).
91. Id § 5302.30(E)(2).
92. Id. § 5302.30(1).
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each prospective transferee . . as soon as is practicable."'93 The
statute provides that when "any act, occurrence, or agreement"
renders an item on the delivered disclosure form inaccurate, the
subsequent inaccuracy does not cause the seller to be in noncom-
pliance with the disclosure requirements.9 4 The statute allows but
does not require the seller to amend in writing any information in
the delivered disclosure form.95 Upon receipt of the disclosure
form, the buyer must return an acknowledgment of the receipt to
the seller.96
The significant differences between Ohio's procedure and that
of other states are in the requirements for approximations, amend-
ments, and time of delivery of the completed disclosure form to
the buyer. Virginia explicitly requires that any approximations
made be clearly identified as such.' Both Alaska and California
require sellers to make "a reasonable effort to ascertain" the infor-
mation before approximating it, and if approximation is necessary
to clearly identify it as such.98 Alaska, South Dakota, and Virginia
require written amendments when information on a delivered dis-
closure form is subsequently rendered inaccurate.9 In addition,
Alaska and South Dakota require the seller to deliver the disclosure
form to the buyer before the buyer submits a written offer on the
property.' ° In contrast, Wisconsin only requires the seller to de-
liver the disclosure form to the buyer "not later than 10 days after
acceptance" of the sales contract." Ohio's procedural require-
ments are well-defined, yet still provide some flexibility to the
seller. This flexibility in making approximations and delivering the
form to the buyer may work to the detriment of the buyer who is
relying on the accuracy of the disclosures on the form in deciding
whether to make or to rescind an offer on the property."°
93. Id. § 5302.30(C).
94. Id. § 5302.30(F)(2).
95. Id. § 5302.30(G).
96. Id. § 5302.30(H).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-522.
98. ALASKA STAT. § 34.70.040(b); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.5.
99. ALASKA STAT. § 34.70.040(a); S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. § 43-4-38; VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-522.
100. ALASKA STAT. § 34.70.010; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-4-38.
101. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 709.02.
102. See discussion infra part IL.B.3.a. and text following note 114.
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1 3. Seller Liability
The Ohio statute provides that the seller will not be liable to
the buyer for damages arising "from any error in, inaccuracy of, or
omission of any item of information required to be disclosed in the
property disclosure form" if the form had been completed in com-
pliance with the other sections of the statute."°3 However, compli-
ance with the seller disclosure law does not eliminate a seller's
duty to disclose which may be mandated by other Ohio statutes or
Ohio common law to prevent fraud against the buyer. 4 Under
the common law, neither a defense of caveat emptor nor an "as is"
disclaimer clause in the contract defeated an action for fraud. As a
result, the key difference between the new Ohio statute and Ohio's
common law in determining seller liability is the elimination of the
latent-patent defect distinction and the elimination of the risk-shift-
ing effect of the "as is" disclaimer clause.
The extent of seller liability in Wisconsin is similar to that
provided for in the Ohio statute.'0 5 Other states, however, impose
seller liability for violation of the seller disclosure statute itself.
Virginia provides for actual damages or rescission of the contract
"[i]n the event of a misrepresentation in any residential property
disclosure statement or failure to deliver a disclosure" state-
ment.' 6 South Dakota imposes liability for actual damages and
recovery of costs and attorney's fees on the seller "who intentional-
ly or who negligently violates" the seller disclosure statute."°e
Alaska and California impose liability for actual damages on the
seller "who negligently violates . . . or fails to perform a duty re-
quired" by the seller disclosure statute.' 3 Alaska also imposes
"up to three times the actual damages" where the seller "willfully
violates ... or fails to perform a duty required" by the seller
103. OmHo REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(F)(1).
104. Id. § 5302.30(J). For a discussion of these parallel disclosure requirements, see
infra text accompanying notes 207-11.
105. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 709.07 (freeing owner from liability if the owner did not
have knowledge of the error or if the source of the error was information provided by a
public agency or qualified third party).
106. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-524B1, 55-524B2.
107. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 43-4-42.
108. ALASKA STAT. § 34.70.090(b) (the Alaska statute also provides for recovery of
buyer costs and attorney fees, § 34.70.090(d)); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102.4, 1102.8 (the
California statute also imposes liability for actual damages for willful or negligent viola-
tion of the statute or failure to perform any duty prescribed by the statute, § 1102.13).
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disclosure statute."° Although the Ohio statute only implicitly ad-
dresses liability for intentional misrepresentation on the property
disclosure form by preserving the common law action for fraud,
compliance with the statute effectively avoids much of the linger-
ing liability that sellers carried after the close of the transaction
under the prior common law."'
4. Buyer Remedies
Although the Ohio statute is comparatively silent on the issue
of seller liability for violation of the disclosure statute itself, the
statute is more explicit than any other state's statute on the issue
of rescission rights of the buyer. Rescission rights are defined in a
temporal fashion by two conditions: (1) if the buyer has received a
property disclosure form prior to submitting an offer on the proper-
ty to the seller, the buyer does not have a right to rescind the
subsequent transfer agreement;"' and (2) as of the date of closing
on the transfer, whether or not the buyer has received a property
disclosure form, the buyer's right to rescind is terminated." 2
Within this timeframe, there are two further limitations on the
buyer's right to rescind. Where the buyer's offer has been accepted
by the seller and subsequently the buyer receives the property
disclosure form from the seller, the buyer may rescind (1) within
three business days following receipt of the property disclosure
form,"3 and (2) within thirty days following the seller's accep-
tance of the buyer's offer."4 The buyer's right to rescind termi-
nates on the earliest of these two dates and the date of closing.
The buyer who received a property disclosure form prior to
submitting an offer to the seller may not subsequently rescind the
transfer agreement. The buyer has had the opportunity to review
the disclosures made by the seller, and the buyer's offer should
theoretically reflect the buyer's determination of the value of the
property with the disclosed defects considered. The seller who has
made the effort to deliver the property disclosure form to the buyer
prior to receiving any offer on the property is justified in relying
on any subsequent offer as reflecting an 'informed consent' to
109. ALAsKA STAT. § 34.70.090(c).
110. See infra text accompanying notes 196-212.
111. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(K)(3)(d).
112. Id. §§ 5302.30(K)(3)(b), (K)(4).
113. Id. § 5302.30(K)(3)(a).
114. Id. § 5302.30(K)(3)(b).
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accept the property with the defects disclosed.
The buyer whose offer on the property is accepted by the seller
and thereafter receives a property disclosure form, as, explained
above, has the right to rescind the agreement which terminates on
the earliest of (1) three days after receipt of the disclosure form,
(2) thirty days after acceptance of the offer, or (3) the date of
closing. It appears that the seller has considerable ability to reduce
the amount of time that the buyer has to examine the disclosure
form before the buyer's right to rescind terminates. For example,
the seller could wait to deliver the disclosure form to the buyer
until 29 days after accepting the buyer's offer or until the day
before closing. In either case, the buyer would have only one day
to consider the items disclosed in order to decide whether to re-
scind the agreement. It appears that the statute's intent was to give
the buyer at least three days to consider the disclosure form. How-
ever, this ability of the seller to shorten the length of time that the
buyer has to review the disclosure form before the buyer's right to
rescind terminates may be manipulated by the seller to pressure the
buyer into making hasty decisions.
Statutes in other states restrict the buyer's right to rescind
using the same events, but allowing differing amounts of time to
act. All of the states except Wisconsin terminate the right to re-
scind on the date of closing of the transfer."' Wisconsin limits
the buyer's right to rescind to within two days after receipt of the
property disclosure form from the seller"6 and to within 12 days
of the seller's acceptance of the offer when the buyer has not
received a disclosure form."' Alaska is virtually identical to
South Dakota, both allowing the buyer to rescind "within three
days after the disclosure statement . . . is delivered in person or
within six days after the disclosure statement ... is delivered by
deposit in the mail" where the form was received by the buyer
after the seller accepted the buyer's offer."' The California provi-
sion is similar, allowing rescission within three days after receipt
115. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.70.090(a) (providing that transfers are not invalidated by
failure to comply with disclosure provisions); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.13 (providing that
transfers are not invalidated by failure to comply with disclosure provisions); S.D. CODI-
FiED LAws ANN. § 43-4-42 (providing that transfers are not invalidated by failure to
comply with disclosure provisions); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-520B(iii) (providing that a buy-
er may terminate prior to "settlement upon purchase of the property").
116. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 709.05.
117. Id § 709.02.
118. ALASKA STAT. § 34.70.020; S.D. CODnHD LAWS ANN. § 43-4-39.
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of the disclosure form if delivered in person, but allowing only
five days where the disclosure form was deposited in the mail."9
Virginia terminates the buyer's rescission rights under the same
time constraints as California; however, Virginia also terminates the
right to rescind upon "occupancy of the property by the [buyer]"
and upon application by the buyer for a loan under a particular
loan provision.' Four of the states tie the buyer's right to re-
scind to the receipt of the disclosure form and the date of closing.
Wisconsin, however, ties the right to rescind to the receipt of the
disclosure form and the acceptance of the buyer's offer. The Ohio
statute can be seen as a combination of these provisions, limiting
the buyer's right to rescind based on the acceptance of the offer,
the receipt of the disclosure form, and the date of closing.
5. The Property Disclosure Form
The final major component of the Ohio statute is the disclosure
form itself. The form, as developed by the director of com-
merce, 2 1 requires the seller to indicate whether the seller has ac-
tual knowledge of past or current conditions affecting the property
divided into twelve sections: A) water supply; B) sewer system; C)
roof; D) basement/crawl space; E) structural components (founda-
tions, floors, interior and exterior walls); F) mechanical systems
(including electrical system); G) wood boring insects/termites; H)
presence of hazardous materials; I) drainage; J) code violations; K)
underground storage tanks/wells; and L) other known material de-
fects." The form specifies that "[u]nless otherwise advised in
writing by the owner, the owner, other than having lived at or
owning the property, possesses no greater knowledge than that
which could be obtained by a careful inspection of the property by
a potential purchaser."'" This admission addresses the seller fa-
miliarity justification for requiring seller disclosure. The form also
specifies that "[u]nless otherwise advised, [the] owner has not con-
119. CAL. Civ. CODE. § 1102.2.
120. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-520B(iv), (vi) (providing that buyer's right to rescind termi-
nates on making a "written application to a lender for a mortgage loan where such appli-
cation contains a disclosure that the right of termination shall end upon the application for
the mortgage loan").
121. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(D).
122. Dep't of Commerce, State of Ohio, Residential Property Disclosure Form, reprinted
in OHIo LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1993, special insert [hereinafter Ohio Residential Property Dis-
closure Form].
123. Id.
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ducted any inspection of generally inaccessible areas of the proper-
ty," and defines "material defects" as "any non-observable physical
condition existing on the property that could be dangerous to any-
one occupying the property or any non-observable physical condi-
tion that would inhibit a person's use of the property."'' 4
Alaska and Virginia require their Real Estate Commission and
Real Estate Board, respectively, to develop the property disclosure
forms."z The statutes of the other states include their property
disclosure forms as a section within the statute. The Wisconsin
property disclosure form requires the seller to mark correct, incor-
rect, or not applicable, statements of knowledge of defects or con-
ditions of the property. For example, "I am aware of defects in the
roof."' The Wisconsin form defines a 'defect' as a condition
that would "have a significant adverse effect on the value of the
property" or "significantly impair the health or safety" of occupants
or "significantly shorten or adversely affect the expected normal
life of the premises."' 7 The South Dakota disclosure form re-
quires the seller to mark yes, no, or unknown to specific questions
concerning four subject areas: lot and title information ("Are there
any unrecorded or recorded liens or financial instruments against
the property, other than a first mortgage?"); structural information
("Are there any cracked interior walls or floors ... ?"); systems
and utility information ("Are there any existing hazardous condi-
tions of the property such as methane gas, lead paint, radon gas in
the house ... ?"); and miscellaneous information ("When was the
fireplace/wood stove/chimney flue last cleaned?")."
The California disclosure form is the most notably different
from those in other states because it includes a separate section for
the seller's broker to complete "based on a reasonably competent
and diligent visual inspection of the accessible areas of the proper-
ty."' 9 Further, the form requires the seller to mark whether the
property has specific items such as a dishwasher, window screens,
and a hot tub, and whether the seller is aware of "significant de-
fects/malfunctions" of specific items such as ceilings, the founda-
124. Id.
125. ALASKA STAT. § 34.70.050; VA. CODE ANN. § 55-525.
126. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 709.03.
127. Id.
128. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-4-44.
129. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6; see also supra text accompanying note 61.
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tion, and the electrical system.'30 All of the disclosure forms, in-
cluding Ohio's, explicitly state that the disclosure form is not a
warranty by the seller nor a substitute for any inspection the buyer
may wish to conduct. In addition, all of the forms suggest that the
buyer may want to have the property professionally inspected.'
In summary, Ohio's seller disclosure statute combines the pro-
visions of a number of other states' statutes, and provides a fairly
straightforward requirement on disclosures. Certain transactions are
specifically excluded from the disclosure requirements, and the
procedures for delivery and receipt of the disclosure form from
seller to buyer are detailed, as are the limitations on the buyer's
right to rescind. Finally, the disclosure form is comparatively spe-
cific and relatively comprehensive regarding the physical condition
of the property.
B. Perspectives Analysis
The analysis of Ohio's seller disclosure statute can be accom-
plished from three different perspectives. The first perspective looks
backward, so to speak, to determine whether the statute is a logical
outgrowth of the policy objectives behind the prior common law.
The second perspective looks laterally at the current state of the
law in other jurisdictions to determine whether the statute moves
Ohio to the forefront on a national level on the issue of seller
disclosure, or whether the statute is a more conservative measure.
The final perspective looks forward toward the implementation of
the statute and its future ramifications. Analyzing Ohio's seller
disclosure statute from these three different angles provides a com-
prehensive understanding of both the advantages and the shortcom-
ings of the new law.
1. Looking Backward
Ohio's seller disclosure statute redefines the seller's obligations
for disclosure of defects in transfers of residential property. The
prior common law did not require the seller to disclose patent de-
fects, but did require the seller to disclose latent defects.' The
statute eliminates this differentiation between patent and latent de-
fects. Instead of characterizing the type of defect, the statute shifts
130. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6.
131. Id.; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-4-44; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 709.03; Ohio Resi-
dential Property Disclosure Form, supra note 122.
132. See supra text following note 57.
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the focus to what the seller knows about the property. Indeed, the
statute requires disclosure of items of which the seller knows that
would not have been considered 'defects' under the prior common
law.
A straightforward example of a case in which the new statute
would require further disclosure as opposed to the prior common
law can be seen by returning to Tipton v. Nuzum.'33 The condi-
tion at issue in Tipton was a leaky basement. The court found that
"the existence of a sump pump and the fact that a hill slopes to-
ward the house" were sufficient ancillary conditions such that it
was the buyer's obligation to "(1) make further inquiry of the own-
er ... or (2) seek the advice of someone with sufficient knowl-
edge to appraise the defect."'34 Essentially, the court ruled that
the ancillary conditions were sufficient to classify the leaky base-
ment as a patent defect, which was the buyer's responsibility to
discover. Additionally, since the buyers agreed to take the property
"as is," the court ruled that the sellers "had no duty to disclose
any knowledge of past water problems with the basement."'35
When the facts of this case are examined in light of the new seller
disclosure law, there are significant changes in the obligations of
both the seller and the buyer.
Under the new statute, the seller would have been required to
disclose the condition of which the buyers complained. The resi-
dential property disclosure form requires sellers to admit and de-
scribe or deny knowledge of "any current flooding, drainage, set-
fling or grading problems affecting the property," and to describe
"any repairs, modifications or alterations to the property or other
attempts to control"'36 such condition within the past five years.
These disclosures would have addressed the sloping grade which
caused excessive run-off to accumulate at the house. The property
disclosure form specifically requires the seller to describe "any
current water leakage, water accumulation, excess dampness or
other defects with the basement/crawl space," and to describe "any
repairs, alterations or modifications to the property or other at-
tempts to control" such conditions within the past five years.'37
These disclosures would have addressed the past and continuing
133. 616 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
134. Id. at 268-69.
135. Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
136. Ohio Residential Property Disclosure Form, supra note 122.
137. Id.
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water leakage problems in the basement and the installation of the
sump pump (if installed within the preceding five years). Therefore,
under the statute, the sellers in Tipton would have had an obliga-
tion to disclosure more information about the property than they
had to disclose under the prior common law.
The sellers in Kaye v. Buehrle'38 also would have had a more
extensive disclosure obligation under the statute than they had un-
der the common law. The sellers would have had to disclose the
fact that the basement "would leak during a torrential rain,' 39 but
not that they had repaired a structural problem in the foundation
wall. The repair work had been done eight years prior to the sale
and the statute requires only disclosure of repairs done within the
preceding five years." The seller's disclosure obligation is ex-
panded by the statute in two ways. First, by eliminating the dis-
tinction between patent and latent defects, sellers must also disclose
defects that are open to observation, discoverable upon a reasonable
inspection, notwithstanding a disclaimer clause in the sales contract.
Second, by requiring disclosure of repair work done in the preced-
ing five years, sellers must disclose conditions that were defective
but are now remedied. These two aspects of the new seller disclo-
sure obligation are expansions of the obligations which were pres-
ent under the prior common law.
The statute not only places additional burdens on the sellers,
but also corresponding additional restrictions on the buyers. The
seller who complies with the disclosure statute is protected against
subsequent claims for nondisclosure and is able to eliminate the
buyer's right to rescind a purchase agreement by providing the
buyers with the disclosure form prior to receiving the buyer's
offer. 4' Almost all of the buyers who bring actions for nondis-
closure have discovered the defect after completing the purchase
and taking possession of the premises. The statute eliminates the
buyer's cause of action for nondisclosure by virtue of the disclo-
sure form and the statute terminates the buyer's right to rescind
upon the closing date of the purchase.'42 The only remedy avail-
able to the buyer after closing would be an action for fraud.43
138. 457 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
139. Id. at 374.
140. Id. at 376; see also supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 103, 111.
142. See supra text accompanying note 112.
143. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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By removing alternative remedies, the statute forces the buyer to
either commit to the purchase or rescind the offer before the sellers
have relied on the finality of the transaction represented by accep-
tance of the offer and the closing.
One purpose of the seller disclosure statute is to provide the
buyer with a standardized summary of information concerning the
property that the seller has acquired by virtue of occupying it.'"
The justification for this transfer of information is that the buyer
will be better able to assess the value of the property and yet the
seller will not be injured by being required to present the property
in a light that reflects its actual condition. 45 Correspondingly, the
buyer's recourse for claims of nondisclosure and the option to re-
scind the purchase are limited, thus increasing the seller's ability to
rely on the certainty of the transaction. Thus a compromise is
worked in the disclosure statute that balances the increased disclo-
sure obligation on the seller against the restricted availability of
remedies for the buyer. Overall, the statute has the potential to
decrease litigation and increase certainty in residential property
transfers. This certainly is a substantial benefit: some authorities
assert that well over half of the litigation regarding property trans-
fers involves actions for nondisclosure."
2. Looking Laterally
Comparing Ohio's statute to similar statutes in other jurisdic-
tions provides another perspective for evaluation of the new disclo-
sure provisions. Although the procedural disclosure provisions are
relatively similar among the states with statutory seller disclosure
requirements, 47 the substantive disclosure provisions, those condi-
tions which are expressly required to be disclosed, hold substantial
diversity. Ohio's statute is fairly comprehensive with respect to
physical components of the property, but is silent as to nonphysical
components. Other jurisdictions have express provisions on a num-
144. For further discussion of purposes underlying seller disclosure statutes, see supra
text following note 73.
145. For an economic analysis justifying imposing a duty to disclose on the seller as
the least cost avoider, see Ellen . Curnes, Note, Protecting the Virginia Homebuyer: A
Duty to Disclose Defects, 73 VA. L. REv. 459, 467-78 (1987).
146. See Lawlor, supra note 61, at 90 ("According to some insurance industry estimates,
two-thirds of buyers' claims against sellers and brokers involve non-disclosure . . . ");
Saltzman, supra note 59, at 62 ("Sellers who allegedly don't come clean on known de-
fects . . . account for two thirds of all lawsuits against real-estate agents and sellers.").
147. See discussion supra part IHL.A.2.
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ber of nonphysical components of the property. An evaluation of
those items which other jurisdictions address, but on which Ohio is
silent, may illustrate some intriguing shortcomings of Ohio's new
statute.
a. Nonphysical Defects: Extrinsic to the Property
Some of the shortcomings of the Ohio seller disclosure law
become apparent when the statutes from other states are examined
on the issue of nonphysical defects."4 The California statute is
the easiest to examine because it was enacted in 1987, thus allow-
ing time for the California courts to interpret the statute. One of
the nonphysical items requiring disclosure under the California
statute is "[n]eighborhood noise problems or other nuisances."'49
The case of Alexander v. McKnight' involved a preemptive suit
for damages, based on the California seller disclosure statute, be-
fore the property had been put up for sale. 5' The Alexanders
sued their neighbors, the McKnights, for the diminution in value of
the Alexanders' property. The Alexanders claimed that this diminu-
tion in value would be realized upon the required disclosure to
potential buyers that the McKnights were problem neighbors.'
The court concluded that the Alexanders would have to disclose to
a potential buyer that there were neighborhood problems. 3 The
court also concluded that "such a disclosure would affect the mar-
ket value" of the Alexanders' property."4 The illustrative purpose
148. The South Dakota statute specifically addresses nonphysical "psychological defects,"
see infra text accompanying note 176, and requires disclosure of "any other problems that
have not been disclosed above," without defining "problems." S.D. CODIFmED LAWS ANN.
§ 43-4-44(IV)(10). Wisconsin requires disclosure of "other defects affecting the property"
and defines "defects" as "a condition that would have a significant adverse effect on the
value of the property [or] that would significantly impair the health or safety of future
occupants of the property." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 709.03. Therefore, Wisconsin does not
limit disclosures to physical conditions.
149. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6.
150. 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Ct. App. 1992).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 456. The McKnights' problem behavior, which was found to violate the
housing development's restrictive covenants, was "operating a tree trimming business from
their house involving the 'use of a noisy tree chipper,' engag[ing] in other activities re-
suiting in excessive noise, e.g. late-night basketball games, park[ing] too many cars on
their property and pour[ing] motor oil on the roof of their house." Id. at 455.
154. Id. at 456. The lower court had awarded the Alexanders $24,000 in prospective
damages for diminution in value, however, the Court of Appeals disallowed the award for
prospective damages but remanded the case to determine whether the Alexanders were
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of Alexander in this discussion is to determine whether this type of
"defect" should trigger disclosure under Ohio's seller disclosure
statute.
The defect in Alexander can be characterized as a nonphysical
defect not on the property which negatively affects its value. In
addition to neighborhood nuisances, such nonphysical defects could
be pending municipal zoning changes or utility assessments, or area
crime and safety issues. 5  The Ohio property disclosure form
does not require disclosure of these types of defects.' The form
does provide a catch-all provision requiring the seller to disclose
"other known material defects currently in or on the property,"'5 7
and the form defines "material defects" as "any non-observable
physical condition existing on the property that could be dangerous
to anyone occupying the property or ... would inhibit a person's
use of the property."'"5 The requirement that the defect must be a
"physical condition existing on the property" may eliminate these
nonphysical extrinsic defects from required disclosure under this
statute despite their negative impact on the property value.
The issue of disclosure of neighborhood crime faced an Ohio
court recently in Van Camp v. Bradford.'59 The buyer was a sin-
gle mother with a teenage daughter. The seller was also a single
mother with a teenage daughter. Four months before Van Camp
purchased the home, a woman was raped at knife point in the
house. Two months later, another rape occurred in the neighbor-
hood."6 When Van Camp inspected the property prior to closing,
she noticed and inquired about the bars on the basement windows.
Bradford, the seller, responded "that a break-in had occurred six-
entitled to the award "because of the McKnights having negligently and intentionally
caused their emotional distress." Id. at 458.
155. The Michigan disclosure statute requires disclosure of some neighborhood nuisances
under the heading "environmental concerns (i.e., proximity to a landfill, airport, shooting
range, etc.)." MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 565.957 (1994). See Patricia Esser Cooper, The Wave
of Seller Liability, PROB. & PROP., July-Aug. 1992, at 26, 30 (suggesting that nonphysical
defects may be "that the seller had AIDS or cancer . . . . that the property was located
in an area under health department study for cancer or leukemia clusters, that the house
had been burglarized many times or that a 'ghost' was in residence").
156. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24. The form does require information con-
cerning building and housing code violations, but such violations are typically found in
physical conditions (i.e., deficient wiring, plumbing, or roofing).
157. Ohio Residential Property Disclosure Form, supra note 122.
158. ld.
159. 623 N.E.2d 731 (Ohio C.P. 1993).
160. Id at 734.
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teen years earlier, but that there was currently no problem with the
residence" yet still advised Van Camp to leave the bars in
place. 6' After Van Camp completed the purchase and took pos-
session of the house, a neighbor told Van Camp about the two pre-
vious rapes in the area, and within two months Van Camp's house
was burglarized. Subsequently, Van Camp filed suit against Brad-
ford alleging that the seller knew of the unsafe character of the
neighborhood and failed to disclose this "material fact" to her. 62
Van Camp claimed that knowledge of this "material fact" would
have influenced her decision to purchase the house.63 After the
suit was filed, Van Camp received threatening phone calls and two
more rapes occurred in the neighborhood within the following three
months."'
The sale of the house was prior to the effective date of Ohio's
disclosure statute; therefore, the seller's disclosure obligations were
governed by the common law. The court first admitted the applica-
bility of the rule from Traverse that "the principle of caveat emp-
tor has been consistently applied in Ohio to sales of real estate
relative to conditions discoverable by the buyer, or open to obser-
vation upon an investigation of the property."'6" The court noted
that "latent defects do give rise to a duty on the part of the seller,
and constitute an exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor."'
The question before the court was whether the criminal activity at
and near the house could be classified as a latent defect so as to
prevail over the seller's defense of caveat emptor. The court de-
fined the defect by stating "that the property was rendered unsafe
for habitation by the [buyer] due to the serious crimes that had
occurred in and near the residence."' 67 The stigma associated with
such a defect, the court found, was properly classified as a latent
defect. "Due to the intangible nature of the defect at issue here, a
prospective buyer would have been unable to determine from a
walk-through of the house . . . that it was the site of a serious,
unsolved violent crime."'68 The court then concluded that "the
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Van Camp v. Bradford, 623 N.E.2d 731, 734 (Ohio C.P. 1993).
165. Id. at 735 (citing Traverse v. Long, 135 N.E.2d 256, 259 (Ohio 1956)).
166. Id. (citing Miles v. McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367, 1369 (Ohio 1979)).
167. Id. at 736.
168. Id.
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latent nature of the defect at issue here renders the defense of
caveat emptor inapplicable."'69 This is the first Ohio court to rec-
ognize the proximity of criminal activity as a latent defect for
which the burden to disclose to a prospective home buyer was on
the seller.
Under the California disclosure statute, a rash of criminal activ-
ity in the neighborhood may well fall within the disclosure provi-
sion applied in Alexander.' The Alexander court stated that the
statute ought to be liberally interpreted so as to effectuate its pur-
pose, namely "that a buyer will be fully informed on matters af-
fecting the value of the property."'' Whether an item rises to the
level of a "defect" requiring disclosure depends on a finding of
"materiality." "Materiality" is found where the item has "a signifi-
cant effect on the value of [the] property."'72 The Alexander court
found that having "overtly hostile neighbors" could depress the
value of the Alexander's home and, therefore, was a material fact
which must be disclosed on the property disclosure form. By anal-
ogy, a rash of criminal activity in one's neighborhood could nega-
tively affect the value of one's home and, therefore, be considered
a material defect requiring disclosure under California's statute.
In contrast, the Ohio statute does not have the 'neighborhood
nuisance' provision on its property disclosure form that could fore-
warn the next Van Camp. The Ohio form focuses on physical
defects existing bn the property. Thus, the stigma that the court in
Van Camp found to be a latent defect does not fit into any of the
categories of items to be disclosed on the Ohio disclosure form. As
a result, had Van Camp purchased the house after Ohio's statute
had become effective, she would not have found relief within its
provisions. Although sellers have a more expansive disclosure
obligation under the statute, the disclosures are limited to physical
conditions. Disclosure of nonphysical defects, neighborhood nui-
sances, and safety concerns are not compelled by the statute, per-
haps to a buyer's distress.
169. Van Camp v. Bradford, 623 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ohio C.P. 1993).
170. Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Ct. App. 1992).
171. Id. at 455.
172. ld.
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b. Psychological Defects: Intrinsic to the Property
Another type of nonphysical defect that negatively affects the
property value is so-called "psychological defects." Generally, "psy-
chologically impacted property" is property where violent events
have occurred or where an occupant has or had a communicable
fatal medical condition.' South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia
address these psychological defects within their seller disclosure
statutes'74 and twenty other jurisdictions have separate statutory
provisions that specifically address these types of defects.7" Al-
though all these states address the issue of psychological defect,
the treatment of the issue is not consistent with respect to disclo-
sure.
The South Dakota provision requires the seller to disclose
whether "a human death by homicide [or] [o]ther felony committed
against the property or a person on the property" occurred on the
property in the preceding twelve months. 76 This disclosure re-
quirement is not the majority position. The Virginia legislature took
an opposite view on the issue. The Virginia statute states:
[N]o cause of action shall arise against an owner . . for
failure to disclose that an occupant of the subject real
property . . was afflicted with [HIV] or that the real
property was the site of: 1. an act or occurrence which had
no effect on the physical structure . . . or 2. a homicide,
173. Murray, supra note 69, at 694-701 (describing psychologically impacted property as
property with some association with AIDS, ghosts, murders, or suicides); Sharlene A.
McEvoy, Caveat Emptor Redux: "Psychologically Impacted" Property Statutes, 18 W. ST.
U.L. REV. 579, 583-84 (1991) (noting how various state statutes define psychologically
impacted property).
174. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-4-44; TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-207 (1994); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-524A.
175. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710.2 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-
35.5-101 (1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-329cc to 20-329ff (West 1993); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2929 (1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1936(f) (1993); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 689.25 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-16 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 508D (1994); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.250 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37:1468 (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-120 (Supp. 1994);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.600 (Vernon 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.565 (1991); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 47-13-2 to 47-13-3 (Michie Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. it. 59,
§ 858-513 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 93.275 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-20.8-6
(Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-270 (Law. Co-op. 1992); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6573A § ISE (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-37 (1992).
176. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-4-44.
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felony or suicide."
California also specifically precludes liability for nondisclosure of
"the occurrence of an occupant's death upon the real property or
the manner of death where the death has occurred more than three
years prior... or that an occupant of that property was afflicted
with, or died from," a virus causing AIDS.' s
The majority of the states that have "shield laws"'79 for pro-
tecting psychologically impacted properties do not have general
seller disclosure statutes. Thus, the majority of the "shield laws"
characterize whether an occupant of the property has AIDS or
HIV, or whether the property was the site of a homicide, suicide,
or other felony, as "not a material fact or material defect regarding
the condition of real estate that must be disclosed in a real estate
transaction."'80 These statutes typically provide that no cause of
action arises against the seller for nondisclosure of these conditions.
However, many of the statutes go on to caution that the seller
must respond truthfully to a specific inquiry from the buyer con-
ceming the existence of such a condition.'
177. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-524A.
178. CAL CIv. CODE § 1710.2(a).
179. The term "shield laws" is used in this Note to describe laws that "shield home
owners and real estate agents from liability for failure to disclose that the subject property
was the site of a murder, suicide, or other felony or that a member of the seller's house-
hold suffers from HIV virus (AIDS)." McEvoy, supra note 173, at 579.
180. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1468. See also CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-329dd
("The existence of any fact or circumstance which may have a psychological impact on
the purchaser or lessee is not a material fact that must be disclosed in a real estate trans-
action."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2929(d) ("The fact or suspicion that a property
might be or is psychologically impacted is not a material fact that must be disclosed in a
real property transaction."). See also Paula C. Murray, What Constitutes a Defect in Real
Property?, 22 REAL EST. LJ. 61, 63 (1993) ('The disclosure of this information may
have the practical effect of making the homes virtually unsalable and its inhabitants mod-
em-day lepers.").
181. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2929(e) ("No cause of action shall arise against
an owner ... for failure to . . . make a disclosure about or release information about
the fact or suspicion that such property is psychologically impacted."); GA. CODE ANN. §
44-1-16:
No cause of action shall arise against an owner of real property or the agent
of such owner for the failure to disclose in any real estate transaction the fact
or suspicion that such property:
(1) Is or was occupied by a person who was infected with a virus or
any other disease which has been determined by medical evidence as
being highly unlikely to be transmitted through the occupancy of a
dwelling place presently or previously occupied by such an infected
person; or
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The fact that Ohio does not have a separate statutory provision
for psychologically impacted property, and the fact that it failed to
address the issue within the seller disclosure statute cannot be mere
oversight. The Reed v. King' case, which is often cited as being
the genesis of the shield laws,'83 was decided almost a decade
before the Ohio legislature developed the seller disclosure statute.
Because Ohio's disclosure form addresses only physical defects, the
inference is that psychological defects need not be disclosed. How-
ever, the issue of psychological defects and the question of disclo-
sure was examined by the Ohio court in Van Camp v. Brad-
ford.84
The Van Camp court was concerned that allowing a cause of
action for nondisclosure of criminal activity in the neighborhood,
under the latent defect exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor,
would open the door to a flood of litigation on an elusive "stigma"
standard.8 The court recognized that nearly half of the jurisdic-
tions across the nation have "shield laws" which prevent violent
events on the property from being considered as material facts,
thus precluding the use of the latent defect exception to the doc-
trine of caveat emptor for forcing disclosure.' However, the
court found support for a cause of action for stigmatized property
by drawing inferences from an 1984 Ohio Court of Appeals deci-
sion involving the disclosure of a suicide in a house for sale."s
(2) Was the site of a homicide or other felony or a suicide;
provided, however, an owner or the agent of such owner shall answer truthfully
to the best of such owner's or agent's knowledge, any question concerning the
provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this Code section.
182. 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1983); see supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
183. See McEvoy, supra note 173, at 579 (noting that the passage of shield laws may
have been prompted by Reed v. King); Murray, supra note 180, at 61 ("The psychological
impact disclosure trend can be traced back to a 1983 California Court of Appeals case,
Reed v. King.").
184. 623 N.E.2d 731 (Ohio C.P. 1993).
185. See id. at 737.
186. Id. at 738-39.
187. Id. at 737 (citing Brannon v. Mueller Realty & Notaries, No. C-830876, 1984 WL
7018 (Hamilton County Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1984) (finding that the buyers did not have a
cause of action for fraudulent inducement against the seller for failure to disclose a sui-
cide which occurred in the house)). The Van Camp court stated that "[b]y engaging in
this analysis, an Ohio Court of Appeals has tacitly asserted that a remedy for stigmatized
property is available in certain circumstances." Id. The Van Camp court then stated that
"[this de facto recognition of a cause of action for psychologically tainted property is the
natural culmination of the trend regarding property disclosure in Ohio, and will be upheld
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The court then sought to "[c]learly defin[e] the cause of action . . .
to protect the stability of contracts and prevent limitless recovery
for insubstantial harms and irrational fears."'88 The definition is
familiar.
[M]isrepresentation, concealment or nondisclosure of a
material fact by a seller of residential property in response
to an affirmative inquiry is evidence of a breach of duty
on the part of the seller. After inquiry, if the buyer justifi-
ably relied on the misrepresentation or nondisclosure, or
was induced or misled into effecting the sale to his/her
detriment and damage, the buyer has met the burden of
proof required to withstand a summary judgment mo-
tion.18
9
The cause of action for stigmatized property provided by the Van
Camp court is a cause of action sounding in fraud."r° The impor-
tance of the Van Camp decision is that in the application of fraud
to a stigmatized property, the stigma can rise to the level of a
'material fact' to support the action. This is in accord with the Van
Camp court finding that the stigma was a latent defect precluding
the use of the caveat emptor defense in an action for nondisclo-
sure. This finding of materiality in a psychological defect is con-
trary to the legislative decisions in the majority of the "shield law"
jurisdictions which declare that violent events are not material facts
warranting disclosure. Since Ohio's property disclosure statute sup-
plants the prior common law on disclosure, the question is whether
a cause of action for stigmatized property is still available. Al-
though the statute does not require disclosure of psychological
defects, a cause of action does survive as an action in fraud, based
by this court." Id.
188. Id.
189. Van Camp v. Bradford, 623 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ohio C.P. 1993).
190. See, e.g., Brewer v. Brothers, 611 N.E.2d 492, 495 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
An action for fraudulent misrepresentation requires proof of (1) a representation,
(2) which is material to the transaction at hand, (3) made falsely, with knowl-
edge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether
it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred, (4) with the intent of mis-
leading another into relying upon it, (5) justifiable reliance upon the representa-
tion or concealment, and (6) a resulting injury proximately caused by the reli-
ance.
Di Pippo v. Meyer, 263 N.E.2d 907, 909 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) (stating that constructive
fraud may be found where there is no intent to deceive, commit fraud, or create injury).
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on the Van Camp decision and its recognition that a psychological
stigma can be a material fact.
3. Looking Forward
A prospective look toward the implementation and the ramifica-
tions of Ohio's property disclosure statute may indicate issues
inadequately addressed which may subsequently generate new areas
of litigation. Implementation problems lurk in the statute's proce-
dural requirements, and the ramifications of the statute unfold in an
examination of parties' expectations of the statute.
a. Implementation and Procedural Concerns
The procedural requirements of Ohio's property disclosure
statute address, inter alia, how the disclosure form is to be com-
pleted by the seller.'9' The statute allows for approximations on
and amendments to the disclosure form."9 Additionally, seller lia-
bility is not triggered by "error ... inaccuracy ... or omission
[that] was not within the [seller's] actual knowledge."'9 These
qualifications provide some flexibility for the seller in complying
with the disclosure statute. However, these qualifications may also
create argument as to the "completeness" of the disclosure form.
The purpose of disclosure is to provide the buyer with infor-
mation concerning the property. However, if the "completeness" of
the form is called into question, it can be argued that the value of
this information is limited. Assume the seller admits on the prop-
erty disclosure form that he or she knows of "current water leak-
age, water accumulation, excess dampness, or other defects with
the basement," and that he or she describes the condition by writ-
ing "water leaks into the basement when it rains." Assume the
buyer, aware of this admission and after transfer of the property,
stores personal items in the basement on top of pallets to keep
them dry in case the basement leaks. When it rains and the "water
leakage" turns out to be several feet of water in the basement, the
buyer is likely to call foul regardless of the prior disclosure."'
Although the seller is required to acknowledge and then describe
191. See supra text accompanying notes 89-96.
192. Oino REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5302.30(E)(2), (G).
193. Id. § 5302.30(F)(1); see supra text accompanying note 103.
194. See Long v. Brownstone Real Estate Co., 484 A.2d 126, 128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(holding that a six-inch watermark on basement walls did not put buyer on notice of
potential flooding that rose to the top of the basement ceiling).
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the defect, there may still be discrepancies, or understatements as
to the degree and severity of the defect. This is problematic be-
cause the severity of the defect often indicates the length of time
that the premises has deteriorated. Further, the length of time of
deterioration is usually directly proportional (or, perhaps, exponen-
tially related) to the cost of repairing the damage. It is the accura-
cy of the original description of the defect, which is logically relat-
ed to repair costs, that the buyer will rely on to properly assess the
value of the property.
The disclosure statute does not focus on the accuracy of the
disclosure per se. Indeed, the statute expressly provides for approx-
imations. Granted, the statute does require the seller to disclose
items within the seller's actual knowledge under a "good faith"
obligation. However, the seller is not liable for damages arising
from inaccuracies on the property disclosure form that are not
within the seller's actual knowledge. By their nature, there are
many types of defects, the severity or extent of which may be well
beyond the actual knowledge of the seller. Examples of such de-
fects are structural damage caused by a leaky roof or termite infes-
tation. Allowing buyers to litigate over semantics will warrant
subjective evaluation of the "completeness" of the description of
defects. This will mire the courts in language interpretation, thus
actually fostering the type of litigation that the legislature had
hoped to avoid by implementation of the disclosure statute.
As a result of this functional shortcoming, it may be necessary
to adopt an interpretation of the statute such that disclosure of
defects on the form shifts the responsibility for the defect to the
buyer. The buyer is put "on notice" of the defect, and it is then
the buyer's obligation to conduct further inquiry and inspection to
determine the extent and consequences of the defect. Once the
buyer is aware of the defect by virtue of the disclosure form, it
should be the buyer's responsibility to flush out the extent of the
defect by direct inquiry posed to the seller. For example, the
buyer should ask how often the basement leaks: during the spring
thaw or every time it rains? How much does it leak: dampness on
the walls and floor or two feet of standing water? How long has it
leaked? What remedial measures has the seller undertaken to elimi-
nate or minimize the condition? This would, in effect, be charac-
terizing the defect as a "patent defect." Under the prior common
law, a defect which was "observable" was considered "patent," and
the seller had no obligation to disclose it. Rather, it was the
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buyer's obligation to investigate the condition further.'95 With this
interpretation of the statute concerning "completeness" of the form,
the value of the disclosure form to the buyer is limited to inform-
ing the buyer of conditions that may need further investigation.
b. Ramifications and the Expectations of Buyers and Sellers
Forecasting the ramifications of Ohio's property disclosure
statute requires examining what buyers and sellers expect from the
new law. If the new law fulfills these expectations, the statute is
likely to further the underlying policy objectives which instigated
its adoption in the first place. If the new law does not fulfill these
expectations, the statute may have fallen victim to the political
compromising and negotiation that is inherent in the legislative pro-
cess.
From the seller's point of view, the property disclosure statute
should promote increased certainty of transactions, stability of
contracts, and limitation of seller liability. Under the prior common
law, sellers were vulnerable to the powerful remedy of rescission
for mere mistake of fact.'96 Sellers could close the sale on their
old house, move into their new house, and then, several months
later, find that the sale had been rescinded. The proceeds from the
sale, likely to have been relied upon to purchase the new house,
would not be forthcoming. This was, arguably, the harshest sanc-
tion enforceable against sellers. The closing date on the sale did
not represent finality of the transfer, the contract signed was not
secure, and substantial liability to the buyers still loomed in the
background. Curtailing this uncertainty and severe liability may
well have been, from the seller's point of view (and that of sellers'
brokers) the most important aspect and benefit of the new disclo-
sure statute.
On this issue of uncertainty and liability after the transaction,
the statute performs well. The statute expressly provides that as of
the date of closing, if not sooner, the powerful remedy of rescis-
sion is foreclosed to the buyer.'97 The seller has the power to
preclude any rescission rights of the buyer by providing the buyer
195. See supra text following note 57.
196. See Di Pippo v. Meyer, 263 N.E.2d 907, 909 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) (stating the
Ohio common law rule that a buyer who has been induced by a mere mistake of fact
can rescind a contract due to constructive fraud); see supra text accompanying note 57.
197. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(K)(3)(b); see supra text accompanying notes
111-14.
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with the property disclosure form prior to the buyer making an
offer on the property. 98 Therefore, if the seller distributes disclo-
sure forms to all prospective buyers, perhaps at the initial inspec-
tion of the property, the seller can rely on any subsequent offer
that leads to a purchase agreement as being final.
Even where the seller enters into the purchase agreement before
providing the buyer with the disclosure form, the seller retains
some ability to manipulate the termination of the buyer's rescission
rights. The buyer may rescind the purchase agreement any time
prior to receiving the property disclosure form,' 9 but at that
point, only within the earlier of three days after receipt of the form
or thirty days after the purchase agreement (assuming the transac-
tion has not yet closed).' Therefore, the seller has the power to
limit rescission because rescission can be restricted by delivery of
the property disclosure form. Were the seller to provide the buyer
with the property disclosure form on the 29th day after the pur-
chase agreement, or on the day before closing, the buyer has only
one day to rescind based on those disclosures. The cautious buyer
may become suspicious of the delay in receiving the disclosure
form, and could rescind prior to receipt of the form, but the statute
does not grant the buyer a right to extend the time period to con-
sider the disclosure form before the right to rescind terminates. The
statute's express provisions limiting the buyer's rescission rights
and providing finality as of the closing date adequately addresses
sellers' major dissatisfaction with contract instability and lingering
liability under the prior common law on disclosure.
The questions of certainty, contract stability, and lingering
liability may not have been the only concerns of sellers under the
prior common law. One of the reasons that the legislature was
asked to develop a statute on disclosure requirements was the
changing and elusive nature of defects that the courts were requir-
ing to be disclosed.2' Notwithstanding questions of habitation by
ghosts ' and the stigma of being a murder scene," 3 the courts
198. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(K)(3)(d).
199. Id. § 5302.30(K)(4).
200. Id. §§ 5302.30(K)(3)(a)-(b); see supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 59-69.
202. See Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 677 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that
a seller who had undertaken to inform the public about her belief that the house was
haunted owed the same duty to the buyer).
203. See Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130, 130 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a buyer
could maintain an action for rescission and damages against the seller for failing to dis-
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were increasing the protection of buyers for what is typically re-
garded as one of the largest investments a buyer will ever make.
This protection was being afforded by the courts through the cre-
ation of exceptions to the doctrine of caveat emptor and the mold-
ing of defects into those exceptions.' 4 The result was an increas-
ing and uncertain disclosure obligation on the seller. Therefore, an-
other expectation of sellers may be that the new property disclosure
law provide reasonable straightforward guidelines for required dis-
closures in order to preclude actions for nondisclosure.
Although the property disclosure law has produced a disclosure
form that is fairly comprehensive,' ° the language of the statute
leaves the door open for further disclosure obligations, beyond
those itemized on the form."4 The disclosure form does serve as
a guideline to assist the seller in a systematic evaluation of the
physical condition of the property. By completing the eleven items
on the form,2'7 the seller is forced to focus on and consider each
component of the property. This systematic evaluation assists the
seller by essentially requiring the seller to answer specific questions
instead of very general questions. For example, the seller must
consider the question of whether the roof currently leaks rather
than whether the property has any latent defects. The specificity of
the questions assists the seller in remembering problems and re-
pairs, and helps prevent an innocent mistake of fact. Therefore, the
property disclosure form does provide adequate guidelines by item-
izing which defects must be disclosed and assisting the seller in
remembering those defects.
However, sellers may also expect that a good faith effort to
complete the property disclosure form in compliance with the stat-
ute will release them from all liability for defects in the property.
The statute does not provide for such immunity. The statute ex-
close that the house was the site of a multiple murder).
204. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Real Estate Sales and the New Implied Warranty of Lawful
Use, 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 32 (1985) ("Many courts, it is clear, are dissatisfied today
with the application of the caveat emptor doctrine to real estate sales. They have ex-
pressed their dissatisfaction by seizing upon a variety of theories that soften the doctrine's
impact on unsuspecting and poorly advised buyers."); Jones, supra note 3, at 218-20 ("To
the general rule that a seller has no duty to disclose material facts to a purchaser,
the . . . courts [have] continued to develop various mitigating qualifications . . . . Perhaps
frustrated by attempts to tame caveat emptor, some courts and commentators began to
devise methods to destroy it.").
205. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
206. See supra text accompanying note 104.
207. See supra text accompanying note 122 (describing the 11 items on the form).
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pressly provides that disclosing required items on the form does
not limit any obligation to disclose further items."8 The question
then is what disclosure obligation does the seller have beyond that
of section 5302.30 of the Ohio Revised Code. Transfers of real
property of the type now governed by the property disclosure stat-
ute were previously governed by the common law. The common
law disclosure obligation of sellers revolved around latent defects.
The specificity of the property disclosure form is designed to bring
out those defects (patent or latent) of which the seller has actual
knowledge. Therefore, the common law disclosure obligation is
embodied within the new statutory disclosure obligation and there
is no further common law disclosure obligation beyond the statute.
Actions for fraud, however, were outside the common law
doctrine of caveat emptor and the exceptions thereto. Disclosure
obligations to preclude fraud, then, survive the new statute. This
may be a confusing disclosure obligation; a cause of action for
fraud may not need proof of a false statement, nor an intent to
mislead.' However, fraud does need a material fact at issue.2"'
The completion of the property disclosure form, by systematic
evaluation of each of the property's components, is likely to flush
out these material facts. Therefore, although the disclosure obliga-
tions to preclude allegations of fraud survive independent of the
disclosure obligations itemized on the property disclosure form, the
material facts which could give rise to an action for fraud are
likely to be disclosed on the property disclosure form.2" Howev-
er, the fact remains that the seller's expectation that the property
disclosure statute embody the complete disclosure obligation is not
completely satisfied. Technically, the continuing independent obli-
gation exists to disclose any item that would give rise to an action
for fraud.
On the other side of the transaction is the buyer. The buyer
expects the statute to compel disclosure of specific information
208. O-1o Ray. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(J); see supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
209. See Di Pippo v. Meyer, 263 N.E.2d 907, 909 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) (finding con-
structive fraud by sellers who did not know about the defect); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 189-90 (stating that the cause of action for stigmatized property is a cause of
action sounding in fraud which can be maintained by showing a justifiable reliance on a
misrepresentation or nondisclosure).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 189-90 (setting forth the elements for a cause
of action in fraud).
211. But see discussion, supra text accompanying notes 182-90, for cases in which non-
physical stigma defects have given rise to actions for fraud.
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necessary to evaluate a particular property. Such information pro-
vided on a uniform basis facilitates comparison shopping. Once
again, the specificity of the disclosure form provides in large mea-
sure just such assistance and direction. However, the buyer must
realize that the required description of defects and repair are open
to interpretation. 2 The buyer should treat disclosures of defects
as "red flags" which warrant further inquiry and investigation to
determine the extent and severity of the defect. Information as to
these aspects of the defect are really what the buyer needs to accu-
rately assess the impact of the defect on the value of the property.
Besides investigating items disclosed on the property disclosure
form, the buyer also needs to consider items not disclosed. Defects
not within the seller's actual knowledge and repairs undertaken
over five years ago will not be disclosed on the form. The proper-
ty disclosure form requires disclosure of "material problems" pres-
ently occurring and remedial measures taken in the preceding five
years.213 Whether the advantage to the seller (of not having to
disclose earlier repair work) outweighs the disadvantage to the
buyer (of not knowing all problems and remedial measures taken)
depends on the type of problem and remedy involved. If, for ex-
ample, the problem was a leaky roof and the seller had the roof
shingles replaced twenty years ago, these items would not have to
be disclosed. However, the life of a shingle roof is about twenty
years and, therefore, it is likely that the roof would now need re-
placement.214 Therefore, it is the buyer's responsibility to inquire
about the age of the roof and to determine the likelihood that it
needs replacement. This obligation was also present in the prior
common law, embodied in the buyer's duty to investigate and dis-
cover patent defects. It is important that the buyer understand that
routine maintenance of items which have a relatively long useful
life is not required to be disclosed on the property disclosure form.
Therefore, substantial repair costs may be incurred after the transfer
notwithstanding a properly completed disclosure form. It is not
unlikely that disclosure of certain information on the disclosure
form will inadvertently suggest that no other conditions exist of
which the buyer ought be aware when considering the value of the
212. See supra text following note 194 (stating that under the disclosure form, descrip-
tions of the severity of property defects will be only approximations).
213. Ohio Residential Property Disclosure Form, supra note 122.
214. MICHAEL W. LrrCHFIELD, RENOVATION: A CoMPLETE GUtDE 98 (1982) (listing the
estimated life of a number of components of a house).
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property.
The possibility that other important conditions exist beyond
those disclosed is also reflected by the requirement that the seller
disclose only those conditions of which the seller has "actual
knowledge." The buyer should be aware that when a seller has no
actual knowledge of a defect the seller is not asserting that no
defect in fact exists. 215 It is not unlikely that the property has a
problem with termites, a leaky roof, or an electrical code violation
of which the seller is not aware. Again, it is important that the
buyer not be lulled into a false sense of security that these condi-
tions do not exist when they are not reported on the property dis-
closure form.
This point is illustrated by a review of Brewer v. Brothers.1 6
In Brewer, the sellers had done extensive remodeling of their
house, including rewiring the electrical system, prior to placing the
house on the market. The buyer specifically inquired about the
electrical system to which the sellers responded "[y]ou have noth-
ing to worry about."2 "7 The buyer "specifically relied upon [the
seller's] representations regarding the electrical system in choosing
not to have an electrical inspection done. 21 8 The seller disclosure
statute does not protect sellers from actions for fraud, so if there
was evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation, the buyer could re-
cover damages.219 However, if the seller made the statement with-
out knowledge of its falsity, then the seller can be said to have no
actual knowledge of "any current problems or defects" with the
electrical system.' The seller would make no notation on the
property disclosure form to indicate electrical code violations and
the seller would have no liability for damages arising from errors,
215. See Wilson v. Century 21 Great W. Realty, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 783 (Ct. App.
1993) (finding no liability for nondisclosure of structural defect of which seller had no
knowledge, "[i]ndeed, one who claims to be 'aware' of no defects necessarily leaves open
the chance that unknown defects do exist"); see also Debra Peterson Conrad, Truth or
Consequences? Residential Seller Disclosure Law, Wisc. LAW., Aug. 1992, at 9-10 (dis-
cussing Wisconsin's disclosure statute) ("An owner completing the report is only telling
what he or she knows or does not know about the property. Thus, the report is only as
good as the owner's understanding of the form, actual awareness of property defects and
honesty in revealing the same.").
216. 611 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
217. Id. at 493.
218. Id. The court of appeals remanded the case to determine whether the evidence sup-
ported an action for fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at 495.
219. See OmO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5302.30(3), (L) (stating that the statute is not in-
tended to limit remedies for causes of action outside the statute's provisions).
220. Ohio Residential Property Disclosure Form, supra note 122.
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inaccuracies, or omissions on the form.22 ' If the buyer infers from
the property disclosure form that no problems in fact exist with the
electrical system, the buyer may, as Brewer did, decline to have a
professional inspection of the system to his later detriment.
Therefore, the value of the property disclosure form to the buyer
lies only in the positive admissions of the seller of problems and
remedial measures taken. Negative admissions are not the equiva-
lent of a statement that no problems in fact exist.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ohio's residential seller disclosure statute explicitly addresses
the major areas of dissatisfaction with the prior common law: the
question of what defects had to be disclosed and the issue of lin-
gering liability for the seller after the property transfer transaction
had closed. The statute eliminates the patent-latent defect distinc-
tion and the risk-shifting effect of a disclaimer clause. Essentially,
all sellers must complete a comprehensive disclosure form on the
physical condition of the property, and such disclosure forecloses
the potential of rescission after the closing on the property.
However, the statute does not address nonphysical defects,
leaving the door open for substantial liability to sellers for nondis-
closure of such intangibles as local crime through an action in
fraud. For buyers, inappropriate reliance on the actual disclosures
may result in additional financial outlay for which they were un-
prepared. Although the new statute defines relatively well the
seller's disclosure responsibilities, the buyer, as under the prior
common law, protects her own best interests by asking additional
questions.
DAIVIA S. KASPER
221. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(F)(1) (stating that as long as the errors,
inaccuracies, and omissions are not within the actual knowledge of the seller, the seller
has no liability for damages arising from such).
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